The Battle of Midway
Like its name suggests, the Battle of Midway was fought at the Midway atoll not far from the northwestern end of the Hawaiian islands in the North Pacific. The atoll was an important refueling stop for transpacific flights which made it strategically important for both the United States and Japan. Due to its proximity to Hawaii, the United States could not afford to allow it to be captured by Japan, while the latter saw a major potential in its seizure as it could be used as a base for the attack on Hawaii and perhaps even the ticket to negotiated peace with the United States. However, the Japanese high command was not thrilled about the Operation Mai or attack on the Midway atoll that was proposed by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, Isoroku Yamamoto.
The Japanese high command was aware that the Americans will not let go the atoll easily but they were also worried that holding Midway without Hawaii would be unsustainable in the long term. Yamamoto's suggestion to attack the atoll in January 1942 was therefore refused. The commander of the Combined Fleet, however, refused to give up and came up with another plan involving an attack on Midway in April 1942. But Yamamoto's new plan which was finally accepted in early May 1942 was not as much interested in capturing of the atoll near Hawaii but had a completely different goal – destruction of the US carriers in the Pacific which would allow Japan to establish supremacy in the Far East and force the United States into negotiation.
Yamamoto had chosen Midway because he knew that the United States will send all available forces to defend it. He was convinced that he can strike the final blow to the US Navy in the decisive battle. But the commander-in-chief of Combined Fleet made several crucial mistakes which would have a major influence on the outcome of the battle. Underestimation of his enemy's strength was one of the greatest mistakes he had made before he send the Japanese fleet to attack Midway. Yamamoto was convinced that the US lost two aircraft carriers in the Battle of Coral Sea in early May 1942, while in reality only one – Lexington had been lost. The second carrier, Yorktown was damaged in the battle but it was fully operational at the beginning of June. Some historians also suggest that Yamamoto had weakened his strength by sending the fleet he intended to send to Midway to less important operations such as the planned invasion of Port Moresby during which he lost a carrier that was supposed to provide support the land invasion of Midway.
In addition to making huge tactical errors, the greatest disadvantage of Yamamoto in the forthcoming battle was the fact that he failed to realize how the Americans were able to find themselves exactly where they supposed to. The Japanese commander-in-chief of Combined Fleet did not know that the Americans have broken the Japanese naval code and that they know exactly what he is planning and when. At the same time, he had fallen for the US counter-intelligence. Yamamoto believed that the US carriers Enterprise and Hornet are far away from Midway and that they will not be able to help during the attack which was, of course, not true.
On June 3, 1942, Yamamoto ordered the attack on Aleutian Islands to divert the American attention from Midway. Some historians, however, suggest that he actually planned a simultaneous attack on the Aleutian Islands and Midway, and that the Aleutian Islands Campaign started one day earlier due to one-day delay in sailing to Midway. Nevertheless, the American forces did not take the bait and concentrated their strength in Midway. The commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet, Chester Nimitz ordered all three carriers – Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet to remain near the Midway atoll and ordered the intelligence to send false information about their location. The three carries with 233 aircraft were accompanied by about 25 support ships and supported by 127 land based aircraft. The command in the battle was again entrusted to Frank J. Fletcher who has proven himself in the Battle of Coral Sea.
The Japanese fleet attacked Midway with four carriers, 2 battleships, about 15 support ships and 248 carrier-based aircraft. Although Yamamoto had one carrier more than his adversary, he did not have a numerical superiority over the Americans like he believed he will have. In fact, his aircraft was outnumbered by the Americans for more than 100 planes.
The Japanese attack of Midway on June 4 started relatively well. Their fleet was spotted and bombarded by the US bombers one day earlier but they had failed to cause any significant damage. Early in the morning of July 4, Admiral Chuichi Nagumo launched an attack on Midway and sent out eight search planes to look for American carriers nearby. The initial Japanese attack on Midway caused major damage but it failed to disable the land-based aircraft. On July 5, he sent all his planes to attack Midway which turned out to be a huge mistake because he could not attack the American carrier group commanded by Raymond A. Spruance who sent out bombers as soon as he spotted Nagumo's carriers.
Spruance suffered heavy loses as only 6 out of 41 planes returned but they confused the Japanese carries and prevented them from launching a counter-attack, pulled the combat air control from their position and dramatically reduced both the fuel and ammunition of many Japanese planes. This allowed the American bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise to reach their target virtually unopposed and destroy three out of four carriers – Soryu, Kaga and Akagi. The fourth carrier, Hiryu managed to escape and launch an attack on Yorktown. The carrier for which the Japanese thought that it was sunk in the Coral Sea was now really sunk. Fletcher was forced to abandon his carrier and hand over the command to Spruance.
After losing three out of four aircraft carriers, the Battle of Midway was lost. Yamamoto's admirals were also unable to save the last remaining carrier which was sunk by the bombers from Enterprise and Hornet on June 6. The Japanese commander-in-chief of Combined Fleet realized that he had lost the decisive engagement and ordered the remaining fleet to return home. Japan lost all four carriers and all 248 aircraft aboard, while 3,057 crew members died during the battle including admirals Tamon Yamaguchi and Ryusaku Yanagimoto. The United States lost one carrier, about 150 planes and one destroyer, while 307 men were killed.
Yamamoto correctly predicted that the Battle of Midway will be the decisive battle between the Japanese and American fleets. However, he was wrong about its outcome. His forces were not only decisively defeated but the Japanese Navy could not recover from the loss of four carriers and many irreplaceable pilots. After the Battle of Midway, the initiative in the Pacific theater was taken over by the Americans who did not only defend Midway and probably also Hawaii but also forced Japan into a defensive position. The war in the Pacific, however, was long from being over.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was still a major force and things could still turn in the Japanese favor. Yamamoto, however, lost all his influence at the Naval General Staff. He was not relieved from his position but he was basically reduced to developing classic defensive strategies. The Japanese commander-in-chief was killed on April 18, 1943, after his plane was shut down by a squadron of Lockheed P-38 Lightning which was ordered to intercept and shoot down Yamamoto's plane. The operation to kill Yamamoto (Operation Vengeance) was authorized by Admiral Nimitz on President Roosevelt's demand.
Raymond A. Spruance who rose to prominence in the Battle of Midway was allegedly criticized for not pursuing the Japanese fleet and allowing it to escape. Nevertheless, he was almost immediately appointed Chief of Staff to the Commander of Chief, Pacific Fleet, then Deputy Commander in Chief and in 1943, he became the commander of the Central Pacific Force. In November 1945, he succeeded Chester Nimitz as the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
